

Industrial, Rational, Liberal, Masculine: Establishing a Catalan Brand in the early 20th Century*

Tobias Klee**

Freie Universität Berlin

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Abstract

By the end of the 19th century, Catalans had become eager to highlight the differences between them and Spaniards. After a century of political crisis and losing its colonial empire, Spain increasingly seemed to have fallen into degeneration, becoming more akin to the “uncivilised” people of Africa. As Spanish intellectuals and European observers agreed, this was mostly apparent in the country's degenerate collective masculinity. When the Primo de Rivera dictatorship began to repress Catalan identity in the 1920s, nationalists like Francesc Macià began to promote the Catalan brand of industriousness, rationality, and masculinity among European countries. The goal was to gather support for Catalan independence, by convincing other countries that Catalonia, unlike Spain, was European. Most notable in that regard was Macià's trial in Paris 1926, after he and his paramilitary group had tried to invade Spain. In this article, I ask, How did Francesc Macià and Estat Català use notions of gender, specifically masculinity, to brand the Catalan nation as civilised and European in Paris, 1926? To this end, I first combine the analytical notions of nation branding and gender. Then, I outline the internal construction of Catalan identity along the notion of masculinity. Afterwards, I analyse Macià's defense of the Catalan case in Paris according to these considerations. Doing so, I demonstrate that Catalan nationalists branded Catalonia as a civilised, liberal, masculine nation by contrasting it with a supposed “African,” uncivilised Spain marked by a barbarian masculinity, a trope still present in contemporary Catalan nationalism.

Keywords: Gender, masculinity, nationalism, Catalonia, nation branding, liberalism

* The historical sources cited in this article were, of course, originally all written in Catalan. The translations given in this text have all been done by me.

**Corresponding author: tobiasjkleee@outlook.de

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On the 8th of June 2014 at noon, people came together to build human towers, several meters high, in Barcelona, Berlin, Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, and Rome. In a concerted effort, the Catalan NGO and cultural patrimony association *Òmnium Cultural* had called upon various groups of *castellers* (participants in the construction of human towers, the *castells*) all over Europe to participate in this performance. In an effort of public diplomacy, they sought to spread awareness and garner international support for an upcoming, non-binding referendum on Catalan independence, held in November 2014.¹⁾

As a UNESCO intangible cultural heritage, the *castells* have become one of the cardinal modes of Catalan self-representation. Relying not on the strength of individual participants to hold up the tower, they rather follow the logic and rules of physics. By distributing the weight of and the responsibility for the tower on every *casteller* (the higher the tower is, the more people have to support the base of the tower), the human tower embodies everything Catalans want in their nation and see as necessary for a successful path towards independence. Everyone has to leave aside their ego, their petty jealousies, and their differences in race, sex, and class. Only by acting in unity, they can successfully forge something larger than the sum of its parts: either a *castell* or an independent Catalonia. Most importantly though, everyone needs to employ *seny*, a self-styled characteristic typical of Catalonia: an amalgamation of rationality, common sense, logical thinking, and level-headedness.²⁾

The idea of logic, rationality, and calculation appears as a striking contrast to what people all over the world would connect with Spain. Arguably, Flamenco, with its fast-paced, expressive movements and singing, is the main cultural practice people associate with Spain. Like nothing else, it seems to embody the Spanish soul, its passion, its sensuality, its oriental mystery, the singing echoing the cries of the muezzins of Al-Andalus.

During my first Spanish course in university, the cover of my course book depicted a female flamenco dancer. She wore a red dress, with large red earrings, black hair, a fan covering half her face, her eyes peeking out above it, directing a coquettish look at the viewer. Similarly, the book for the following course showed two dancers, man and woman, holding each other tightly, and staring at each other intensely, the man in a black shirt, the woman in a red dress which exposed her back.

Flamenco and its presentation are part of deliberate efforts to brand Spain towards foreigners. Flamenco dancers adorn the cover of Spanish textbooks and classroom walls, the promotional material of the Instituto Cervantes, and the streets of Seville close to tourist hotspots. In their effort at nation branding, Spanish cultural institutions seem to have

1) Mariann Vaczi, "Catalonia's Human Towers: Nationalism, Associational Culture, and the Politics of Performance," *American Ethnologist* 43, no. 2 (2016): 359f.

2) *Ibid.*, 360-61.

embraced the old Francoist sentiment that “Spain is different” from the rest of Europe, due to the Islamic presence on the Iberian peninsula in the Middle Ages.³⁾ Meanwhile, the rest of Europe is all too happy to accept this notion, as it seemingly confirms the idea that “Africa begins at the Pyrenees”, a sentiment that emerged in France after the Napoleonic wars.

The contrast between the Catalan and the Spanish branding practices is no coincidence. Already in 1886, Valentí Almirall grappled with the supposed differences between Catalan rationality and Spanish passionate nature. Catalan nationalists would continue this discourse during the decades to come, crafting arguments supporting the idea that Catalonia was more civilised, economically apt, more liberal, European, and more masculine than Spain. After Spain had ceded Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico to the United States in 1898, masculinity specifically became a point of differentiation, next to racial and cultural arguments. Having lost its last major colonial possessions, Spanish intellectuals and European observers argued that the Spanish people were not masculine enough to still belong to the civilised nations of Europe.⁴⁾

Catalan nationalists never tired of using these events as an opportunity to strengthen their economic and political position within Spain, by claiming for Catalonia a masculine identity which protected them from Spanish degeneration. When in 1923 the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera began to suppress Catalan identity, the nationalist and paramilitary organisation *Estat Català*, founded by Francesc Macià, began to promote the image of a civilised, rational, masculine, European Catalonia, internationally to garner support for Catalan liberation. The most public instance of this Catalan nation branding occurred after the group had failed to instigate an insurrection in Catalonia via France in 1926, and were put on trial in Paris. In this article, I will ask: how did Francesc Macià and *Estat Català* use notions of gender, specifically masculinity, to brand the Catalan nation as civilised and European in Paris in 1926? This act of branding stood at the end of a decade-spanning period of defining and consolidating Catalan identity along lines of culture, race, and gender. *Estat Català* was thus able to refer back to a solid catalogue of attributes and images, to court the French public. Not only did this act serve to highlight the strength of Catalonia's national identity to the outside world, but also to assure and strengthen this identity among Catalans themselves during the repression of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. Nation branding was supposed to win international support and to keep the dream of a powerful (independent) Catalonia alive.

My understanding of nation branding follows the definition of Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C.

3) Cf. José Luis Venegas, *The Sublime South: Andalusia, Orientalism, and the Making of Modern Spain* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2018), 49; see generally 42-49, on the rise of flamenco culture as an identifier first for Andalusia and then Spain as a whole.

4) Nerea Aresti, “La hombría perdida en el tiempo: Masculinidad y nación española a finales del siglo XIX,” in *Hombres en peligro: Género, nación e imperio en la España de cambio de siglo*, ed. M. Zabalgoitia Herrera (Madrid and Frankfurt am Main: Iberoamericana/Vervuert, 2017), 21.

E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, and Marcel K. Will, who describe it as “deliberate, collective effort by multiple constituencies to generate a viable representation of a geographical-political-economic-social entity”.⁵⁾ Addressing internal and external audiences, it is the intent by government and non-government actors to depict their nation as a legitimate entity, and thus make it a viable partner to support, invest in, visit, trade with, and diplomatically interact with.

Throughout the article, I will argue that, as a sub-state or a region within Spain, Catalan nation branding relied on the foil of Spain to represent itself. In that regard, gender, through the process of nation branding, served as an internal and external differentiator between Catalans and Spaniards, merging notions of race, culture, history, and behaviour. To this end, I will first delve into theoretical considerations, where I will bring together the analytical category of gender with the practice of nation branding. Afterwards, I will outline which characteristics Catalan nationalists claimed to identify in Catalans, how these made them different from Spaniards and similar to Europeans, and how notions of gender played into these characteristics. Following this, I will briefly deliver the historical context for Macià's trial in Paris, followed by a thorough analysis of his and his movement's verdict. Lastly, I will formulate some concluding remarks.

Gender, Nationalism and Nation Branding

By now, a large academic corpus has analysed and demonstrated the intimate relationship between gender and nationalism. As Anne McClintock famously postulated in 1995: “all nationalisms are gendered, all are invented, and all are dangerous”.⁶⁾ Looking at the example of South Africa, she outlined how Afrikaner nationalism strategically excluded women from politics to further its goals, whilst Black nationalism in South Africa utilised notions of feminism to mobilise women. In both cases though, the idea of womanhood in the nation was strongly tied to the notion of motherhood. Already in 1993, Nira Yuval-Davis discussed how women play a central role within any nationalist visions, namely as the reproducers of the nation; biologically through childbirth, culturally through educating the coming generations in traditions, customs, and culture. They were never, however, conceived of as political actors, who deserved full political rights.⁷⁾

Indeed, nationalisms seemingly offer a broader realm of agencies and roles for men, such as politicians, artists, philosophers, engineers, scientists, etc. As Joane Nagel notes, roles for

5) Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, and Marcel K. Will, “Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy: Exploring the Historical Origins of Nation Branding,” in *Nation Branding in Modern History*, ed. Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, and Marcel K. Will (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2018), 1.

6) Anne McClintock, “Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family,” *Feminist Review* [Online], no. 44 (1993): 61.

7) Cf. Nira Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* [Online] 16, no. 4 (1993): 621-32.

men and women in the nation “are written primarily by men, for men, and about men, and that women are, by design, supporting actors”.⁸⁾ Thus, nationalists tailor nationalism and the nation towards and according to masculine desires, or desires conceived of as masculine. While Nagel asserts that nationalisms in that regard follow the particular script of militarism and the military experience, it is certainly more adequate to ascertain that these masculine desires vary depending on cultural and historical contexts. As Koen Sloomaeckers highlights, within a nation multiple ideas of masculinity are locked into a constant struggle for hegemony, whilst also policing each other for deviating from masculine behaviour. Deviations may stem from actors internal to the nation, most prominently homosexuals, or external to the nation, such as immigrants or foreign states.⁹⁾

Gender thus structures social roles within a nation, and defines a nation's relation to outsiders. In any case, it constitutes a hierarchy, wherein the correct type of masculinity holds all the power. Joan Wallach Scott stressed this phenomenon in 1986, understanding gender as “a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes”, and as “a primary way of signifying relationships of power”.¹⁰⁾ In this understanding of gender, Scott sees the specific value of gender as a category of analysis within historical sciences. As she exemplifies, expressions of power through gendered images might be found, e.g., in the legitimisation of rulership, or the description of the relation between ruler and subjects, where the former is described as masculine and the latter as feminine.¹¹⁾

The history of European colonialism abounds with such examples. Scholars such as Nancy Stepan, Eva Maria Copeland, or Gemma Torres Delgado explain extensively how white European men understood women as developmentally on par with Black men, both of them lagging behind in human evolution, and thus incapable of acting autonomous, rational, and civilised. In contrast to the supposedly superior rational European, they were primitive, barbaric, impulsive, and sexually deviant.¹²⁾ Research such as this has led academics like Kristin Hoganson and Lorraine Bayard de Volo to call for a concerted incorporation of gender as an analytical category in international relations and diplomatic history.¹³⁾

8) Joane Nagel, “Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* [Online] 21, no. 2 (1998): 243.

9) Cf. generally Koen Sloomaeckers, “Nationalism as Competing Masculinities: Homophobia as a Technology of Othering for Hetero- and Homonationalism,” *Theory and Society* [Online] 48, no. 2 (2019): 239-65.

10) Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 1067.

11) *Ibid.*, 1069.

12) Cf. Gemma Torres Delgado, “La reivindicación de la nación civilizada: Masculinidad española en el discurso colonial sobre Marruecos (1900-1927),” *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, no. 39 (2017): 62; see also Ferran Archilés, “¿Carmen a través del estrecho? Imperialismo, género y nación española ante el espejo marroquí (c. 1880–c. 1909),” in *Hombres en peligro: Género, nación e imperio en la España de cambio de siglo*, ed. Mauricio Zabalgaitia Herrera (Madrid and Frankfurt am Main: Iberoamericana/Vervuert, 2017), 60; Nancy Leys Stepan, “Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science,” in *Feminism and Science*, ed. Evelyn Fox Keller and Helen E. Longino (Oxford University Press, 1996), 122f.; Eva María Copeland, “‘Hombres de Otra Raza y Hasta de Otra Edad Más Lejana Parecían’: Masculinity and Imperial Nostalgia in Eduardo López Bago’s *El Separatista* (1895),” *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* 97, no. 9 (2002): 1527f.

Accordingly, the historiography of nation branding could potentially also benefit from including gender into its analysis. After all, how better could a country secure tourists, investors, trade partners, and diplomatic alliances, but by depicting itself and its people as rational, reliable, strong, a place of adventure, civilised, and masculine? L. Pauline Rankin has shown how Canada strategically established a “macho” image on the international stage to appear as a more reliable actor towards its military allies.¹⁴⁾ Meanwhile, Kristín Loftsdóttir explains how nation branding campaigns in Iceland depict its men as a type of non-threatening noble savages, while the land, embodying and embodied by Icelandic women, promises wilderness and adventure.¹⁵⁾

Given this theoretical background, I will analyse on the following pages how Catalonia used notions of masculinity to brand itself as superior vis-à-vis Spain, first, to the audience at home, and second, to an international audience. The objective was to sell Catalans and Europeans on the idea that Catalonia was different from, more civilised than, and definitely more European than Spain, and therefore deserved to be treated as its own national entity.

Escaping “African Backwardness”: The Construction of a Masculine Catalonia

After Spain's defeat in the war of 1898, the predominant perception in Europe and Spain was that Spanish masculinity had fallen out of time, which explained why the country had been incapable of maintaining its empire. From the perspective of the northern European nations, Spain and its men suffered from racial degeneration, brought about by Spaniards intermixing with Muslims during the Middle Ages, situating them on the same evolutionary level as Arabs and Northern Africans. Because of that, they argued, Spanish men exhibited excessive passivity and emotionality, characteristics associated with femininity.¹⁶⁾

Within Spain, intellectuals such as Joaquín Costa or Luis Morote were convinced that the competition between empires and nations in Europe was a competition between different masculinities. Only the nation whose people exhibited the correct type of masculinity could hope to win this struggle.¹⁸ In this struggle, the “caballero español” found himself on the low levels of the social Darwinist ladder, since the values and aspirations he espoused stemmed

13) Kristin Hoganson, “What’s Gender Got to Do with It? Women and Foreign Relations History,” *OAH Magazine of History* [Online] 19, no. 2 (2005): 14-18; Lorraine M. Bayard de Volo, “Cuba’s Missile Crisis and the Logic of National Martyrdom,” *Security Studies* [Online] (2025): 1-28.

14) L. Pauline Rankin, “Gender and Nation Branding in ‘The True North Strong and Free’,” *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* [Online] 8, no. 4 (2012): 266.

15) Katrín Loftsdóttir, “The Exotic North: Gender, Nation Branding and Post-colonialism in Iceland,” *NORA: Nordic Journal of Women’s Studies* [Online] 23, no. 4 (2015): 246–260.

16) Copeland, “Hombres de Otra Raza,” 1529; cf. Torres Delgado, “La reivindicación de la nación civilizada,” 62; see also Archilés, “¿Carmen a través del estrecho?,” 68; Aresti, “La hombría perdida en el tiempo,” 20f.; see also Copeland, “Hombres de Otra Raza,” 1528.

from an age long past.¹⁷⁾

As mentioned above, Catalan nationalists were all too eager to participate in this discourse and to point out the failures of Spanish masculinity. The aforementioned Valentí Almirall argued that Spain had spent all its masculinity in colonising and civilising the Americas.¹⁸⁾ Therefore, it was now unable to suppress the degenerate urges for which Don Juan acted as a symbol.¹⁹⁾ The threat of Don Juan, or *Don Juanism*, lay in an abundance of passion and vices, as well as racial degeneracy. Don Juan, in that regard, was akin to European ideas about African racial deficits, represented through a degenerate masculinity.

Even the sectors of Spanish society which had not yet been infected with Don Juanism were inferior to other European masculinities, according to Almirall. The Spanish Don Quijote, as Almirall explained, was unable to compete with e.g., the British John Bull. While the former adhered to the outdated philosophical school of idealism “supported by the most volatile desire for abstraction” and thus “has fallen to one of the last places in the civilised world”, Anglo-Saxons were a “representation of positivism, based on the practical individualist sentiment”.²⁰⁾ According to Almirall, the Spanish race exhibited an outdated model of masculinity, and therefore was inferior to the modern Anglo-Saxon race, whose characteristics better fit the challenges of its time. Since Spaniards were unwilling to develop ambitious aspirations to counteract their weaknesses, they had fallen behind European civilisations.

Almirall went on to highlight, that Catalans were a people of an entirely different character, “the flipside of the coin of the genuine Castilian”. While Castilians were a generalizing race, keen on idealist abstractions, Catalans were “imminently analysing. [...] We always seek positive advantages”.²¹⁾ Intrinsically positivist, and therefore more rational and pragmatic, they resembled the world-ruling Anglo-Saxons rather than the daydreaming Castilians. In contrast to Castilians, Catalans did not possess an outdated model of masculinity. Castile was the uncivilised past, while Catalonia was the civilised future, so to speak.²²⁾ On the basis of these assertions, Catalan nationalists would later formulate their claims for Catalan autonomy and even independence.

The reason for this difference between Catalans and Spaniards, as per these convictions, stemmed from the fact that Catalonia had remained free from Muslim influences during the

17) Arestí, “La hombría perdida en el tiempo,” 20.

18) Valentí Almirall and Antoni Jutglar, *España tal como es*, 1a ed. en Anthropos (Barcelona: Anthropos Editorial del Hombre, 1983), 59.

19) Ibid., 83.

20) Valentí Almirall, *Lo catalanisme*, 1. ed. (Barcelona: Ed. 62, 1979), 33 and 43.

21) Ibid., 51.

22) A similar discourse existed in *Bulletí del Centre Excursionista de Catalunya*, no. 75 (April 1901): 112ff. argued that the similarity between Catalans and Anglo-Saxons was also present in their shared patron-saint Sant Jordi/St. George. His industrial spirit had allegedly imbued both peoples with the ability to successfully participate in industrial capitalism.

Middle Ages. Accordingly, Catalan nationalist and later first president of the Catalan self-administrative body, the *Mancomunitat*, Enric Prat de la Riba proclaimed that Spaniards were a “predominantly Semitic people: the African and Arab blood transpires in its way of being”.²³⁾ This racial difference allowed Catalans to be positivist and realistic, pensive and calculated (thus possessing *seny*), and thus exhibit desirable traits of masculinity. Spaniards meanwhile remained trapped in the “life of the *hidalgo*” with his failed military exploits, which had only cost him his virility.²⁴⁾

The Catalan nation, meanwhile, had been forged by a “rosary of great men”, poets, historians, politicians, legal scholars, and artists.²⁵⁾ Thanks to these men, Catalonia commanded an enormous political, cultural, and economic capital which Spain lacked, and which made the region the “main representative of European civilisation” on the Iberian peninsula.²⁶⁾ As Prat de la Riba argued in 1906, this put Catalonia in the position to one day civilise Spain and Portugal, unite them in an Iberian empire, and finally take again an active part in colonialism and in shaping geo-politics.²⁷⁾ Enthusiastically, he went on to proclaim that “the Catalan political ideal and the Catalan economy have begun [...] the peaceful **penetration** [emphasis mine] of Spain”.²⁸⁾ Spain, on the verge of national and racial degeneration, lay ripe for penetration by a Catalonia oozing with virile energy, on equal footing with the European powers of its time.

Indeed, Catalonia shared “the ideal of tradition, liberty and autonomy, which England has followed to create the largest empire that has ever existed. This ideal, which our race lived in the Middle Ages”.²⁹⁾ Prat de la Riba had two reference points for imperial grandeur: the British Empire, with whom Catalonia shared an *ideal* and therefore a level of civilisation, and the medieval Kingdom of Aragon, the supposed golden age of Catalonia.

Catalans, racially pure and unstained by Semitic blood, fit well into the contemporary civilised world, while the Castilian race was stuck in the past. The outdated ideal of *hidalgo* masculinity stood no chance in a world that required rationality and racial homogeneity. Prat de la Riba and, to an extent, Almirall relied on the well-established European presumption that Spanish people had overly mixed with Moorish and Jewish people during the medieval period. In that regard, the argument of blood purity also served to firmly situate Catalans

23) Enric Prat de la Riba, *La question catalane: L’Espagne et la Catalogne* (1898), Enric Prat de la Riba, ANC1-137-T-1978. Sant Cugat de Valles, Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya. cp. 1f.

24) Cf. again Almirall, *Lo catalanisme*, 33.

25) Enric Prat de la Riba, *La nacionalitat catalana*, edició facsimil (Barcelona: Escola d’Administració Pública de Catalunya, 1906), 47.

26) Enric Prat de la Riba, Albert Balcells, and Josep Maria Ainaud de Lasarte, *Obra completa: Enric Prat de la Riba*, vol. I, ed. Albert Balcells and Josep Maria Ainaud de Lasarte (Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 1998), 313.

27) Prat de la Riba, *La nacionalitat catalana*, 128.

28) Ibid., 127.

29) Prat de la Riba, Balcells, and Ainaud de Lasarte, *Obra completa*, 313.

among the “successful” races of Europe. It was necessary to separate Catalan history from Spanish history, and the Catalan race from the Spanish race, to situate contemporary Catalonia in a position where it would face a glorious future, and not a deplorable stagnation or even decadence. To make a convincing case, Catalan nationalists had to highlight that Catalans exhibited masculine-coded traits, apt for their times and on par with the leading Anglo-Saxon race, and superior to Spaniards. Spanish Medieval masculinity, tainted and inhibited by Semitic blood, was the antithesis to such self-elevations.

In March 1919, the then president of the Catalan self-administrative body, the *Mancomunitat*, reaffirmed that Catalans were not only the most industrious people in Spain, but generally the “most European”, with a strong desire for liberty. Spain, though, was stuck in an “anachronistic cult of the principles of domination and centralism”.³⁰⁾ Maintaining “African backwardness”, Spain dared to deny Catalonia its autonomy, though it was “spiritually integrated among Western Europe”.³¹⁾ Lagging behind the rest of Europe in political and social developments firmly placed Spain in Africa, geographically and historically, which was also manifest in its degenerate masculine behaviour, e.g., lust for violence. From these claims it followed that Catalonia was indubitably European, and thus deserved, if not independence, then at least vast rights to autonomy.

This desire for Catalan masculinity was not only present among male nationalists. And it was also not limited to racial arguments. Carme Karr, a feminist and nationalist, explained in 1908 that it was up to women, namely mothers, girlfriends, daughters, to assure that their husbands and boyfriends adhered to Catalan culture, mostly the Catalan language. Through policing cultural/linguistic purity, women would ensure that a Catalan man would not only “resemble a 'senyor', but be a 'senyor'”.³²⁾ Women would thus be responsible for ensuring that Catalan men would actually become proper civilised men.

Domènec Martí i Julià, president of the *Unió Catalanista*, also focused on cultural rather than on racial issues, asserting that young Catalans who decided to speak and act Spanish instead of Catalan, were at the heart of many a social issue in Catalonia.³³⁾ Notably, he accused them of engaging in so-called *flamenquisme*, flamenco culture brought to Catalonia by Spanish immigrants from the South. Within the imagination of Catalan nationalism, flamenco culture specifically attracted a criminal clientele, and led to drug usage, alcoholism, prostitution, homosexuality, and cross-dressing.³⁴⁾

30) Josep Puig i Cadafalch, *La Qüestió de Catalunya* (1919), Josep Puig i Cadafalch, ANC1-737-T-1007, Sant Cugat de Valles, Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya, 1f.

31) *Ibid.*, 5.

32) *Ibid.*

33) Domènec Martí i Julià, *Per Catalunya i altres textos* (Barcelona: La Magrana, 1984), 109.

34) Cf. generally Sandie Holguín, “‘Vergüenza y ludibrio de las ciudades modernas’: Los nacionalistas catalanes ante el flamenco en la Barcelona de 1900–1936,” *Hispania* [Online] 73, no. 244 (2013): 439-468

Not only did these young Catalans then betray their Catalan identity, they also behaved in ways that disintegrated their gender/sex. By acting Spanish, they would fall into a lifestyle full of crime, vices, and gender deviance. Such a Spanish-acting Catalan “feminises his personality, perverts his spirit and proudly shows off everywhere the social stigmas of his degeneration”.³⁵⁾ Martí i Julià established an intimate link between gender/sex and national identity. Only a clear consciousness of and loyalty towards one’s national identity assured that one commanded a healthy body in accordance with gender/sex conventions. Succumbing to Spanish culture meant loss of masculinity and the deviation from a moral life.

As we can see, Catalan nationalists were eager to brand Catalonia as different from Spain. While racial and cultural considerations played an important role in these considerations, notions of masculinity (industriousness, rationality, inclination towards liberty and autonomy) were the common denominator that bridged culture and race, whilst also taking cues from them and helped Catalans to ideologically connect their nation with the rest of Western Europe whilst detaching it from Spain. Soon it would be time to market these similarities to the rest of Europe.

Towards a Catalan Paradiplomacy

In December 1918, inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s calls for people’s self-determination, the hegemonic nationalist party in Catalonia, the *Lliga Regionalista*, demanded the right to form an autonomous self-government from the Spanish crown. The initiative was explicitly non-separatist and focused on establishing a legal and orderly procedure to reach its goal.³⁶⁾ This approach ultimately proved unsuccessful, as the *Lliga* failed to gain the support of the left-wing, separatist-minded nationalist groups. The *Lliga* thus reconciled with the central government.³⁷⁾

These more radical groups, like the *Comitè Pro Catalunya*, actively lobbied for Catalan independence during the peace negotiations in Paris.³⁸⁾ Members of the group handed out pamphlets in Versailles, detailing how Catalans had resisted Spanish absolutism and centralism throughout the centuries. They argued that 12,000 Catalans (in reality there were only 1,000 volunteers) had fought against the Central Powers. Now it was upon the Entente to return the favor by supporting Catalan sovereignty.³⁹⁾ The Entente, though, had a more explicit interest in

35) Ibid., 108.

36) Cf. Juan Sánchez González, “Topología discursiva del catalanismo en la Restauración: Cambó ante castellanos, vascos y catalanes,” *Historia Contemporánea*, no. 28 (2004): 453f.

37) Ibid., 803f.

38) Pol Dalmau, “Catalans and Rifis during the Wilsonian Moment: The Quest for Self-Determination in the Post-Versailles World,” *Contemporary European History* [Online] 32, no. 1 (2023): 135.

39) Ibid., 133-137.

a stable Spanish state than in an independent Catalonia and ignored the Catalan paradiplomatic efforts.

Notably, this episode coincided with rising tensions between the Catalan bourgeoisie and the Catalan working class. The years of *pistolerismo* (1917-1923) were marked by waves of strikes initiated by the anarcho-syndicalist trade union confederation CNT, violent clashes between workers and the industrialists' hired guns, as well as targeted assassinations of union leaders. Unable to quell the violence on the streets of Barcelona, the *Lliga* became more reactive than proactive in its political actions.⁴⁰⁾ Finally, in 1922, the Catalan government tasked the Captain General of Barcelona Miguel Primo de Rivera, who had close connections to the *Lliga*, to pacify the city.⁴¹⁾

By this point, the *Lliga* had lost its primacy as the voice of Catalanism, suffering a heavy electoral defeat to the left-wing and explicitly nationalist *Acció Catalana*, the *Lliga's* former youth organisation, in the 1923 provincial elections.⁴²⁾ As Ehrlich puts it, the *Lliga* "succeeded in its goal to 'nationalize' Catalonia through educating the youth, but then found that the youth had become far more radical than the regionalists themselves".⁴³⁾ *Estat Català* would prove to become the most notable offshoot.

The group came into existence after the "Conferencia Nacional Catalana" on the 4th and 5th of June 1922. In protest to the *Lliga's* Spain-friendly policies, the party's youth organisation had called for an assembly of multiple Catalanist activists. On the one hand, participants such as Jaume Bofill i Mates or Antoni Rovira, who were also part of *Acció Catalana*, criticised the *Lliga's* opportunism and advocated for stronger Catalanist policies, while still maintaining the cohesion of Spain. Macià and his followers, on the other hand, promoted separatism and a Catalan State.⁴⁴⁾ While they would never succeed in that endeavour, they went on to help Spanish republicans topple the monarchy in 1931. In exchange, Catalonia would receive a statute of autonomy within the Second Spanish Republic, giving it far-reaching capabilities in questions of law, culture, economy, and internal security. *Estat Català* would transform into the party *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* which would dominate Catalan politics until the end of the Spanish Civil War. Further, Francesc Macià would become the first president of Catalonia during this time period.⁴⁵⁾

40) Angel Smith, "The Catalan Counter-Revolutionary Coalition and the Primo de Rivera Coup, 1917-23," *European History Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (2007): 21.

41) *Ibid.*, 25.

42) Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "Trajectories of Catalan Nationalism and Its Present Discontents," in *Catalonia in Spain and Europe* (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2015), 17.

43) Charles E. Ehrlich, "The Lliga Regionalista and the Catalan Industrial Bourgeoisie," *Journal of Contemporary History* 33, no. 3 (1998): 416.

44) Pere Gabriel, "Las bases políticas e ideológicas del catalanismo de izquierdas del siglo XX," *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie V, Historia Contemporánea*, no. 13 (2000): 87f.

45) Puhle, "Trajectories of Catalan Nationalism," 18.

Before any of that could happen, Catalan nationalism suffered a period of repression after the coup of Primo de Rivera in 1923. The Catalan language was banned from public, official, and political events, and Catalan self-administration was abolished in 1925.⁴⁶⁾ Many Catalan nationalists left Catalonia, attempting to plead their case to international audiences. In April 1924, members of *Acció Catalana* unsuccessfully appealed to the League of Nations, whilst Catalan delegations would also join the International Union of Associations for the League of Nations and the Congress of European Nationalities, in 1925 and 1926 respectively.⁴⁷⁾ Meanwhile, Francesc Macià and his associates would go into exile in France.

A Rebellious Catalonia, a Liberal Catalonia

On October 30, 1926, what is probably one of the most daring exploits in the history of Catalan nationalism began. Starting in France, 400 to 500 armed men, including 60 Italian anti-fascists, led by Macià, began their march towards the French-Spanish border towards the Pyreneen village Prats de Molló. They had a simple goal: cross the mountains into Spain, conquer military camps, acquire further arms and ammunition, incite an insurrection in Catalonia and liberate it from Spanish oppression. Donations from the Catalan migrant communities in the Americas, funds from Macià's wife Eugènia Lamarca i de Mier, as well as warm words of support by the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Comintern facilitated their undertaking.⁴⁸⁾

We can clearly imagine what Macià expected from his soldiers. In 1922, *Estat Català* had issued the pamphlet *Catecisme del Jove Patriota* [Catechism of the young patriot].⁴⁹⁾ Therein, it called on the young patriot to “prepare your intelligence, your physical resistance and your moral strength. [...] Exercise physically. [...] Do not drink, do not gamble, do not prostitute yourself. Put the supreme interest of the fatherland before your personal interest. [...] Be disciplined and hope for the final triumph”. Only when they abstained from vicious behaviour, were physically and mentally fit, ready to fight and make sacrifices, would they be the men who uphold Catalan “liberty [...] justice and [...] honour” of Catalonia, they had to adhere to a strict set of virtues to fulfil their masculine duty. Only then could they potentially hope to separate the Catalonia from Spain.

In this spirit, *Estat Català* and Macià had established a base of operations in France

46) Alejandro Quiroga, *Making Spaniards: National Catholicism and the Nationalisation of the Masses during the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930)* (2005), 82-86.

47) Albert Balcells i González, “Catalanism and National Emancipation Movements in the Rest of Europe between 1885 and 1939,” *Catalan Historical Review* [Online] 685-104 (2013): 94f.

48) Balcells, “Catalanism and National Emancipation Movements,” 95f.

49) *Estat Català, Catecisme del Jove Patriota* (1922), Francesc Macià, ANC1-264-T-51, Sant Cugat de Valles, Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya, 1.

against the Spanish regime. Alongside Spanish Republicans and anarchists, they became part of a large international community of Italian anti-fascists and Irish nationalists who similarly tried to change the political situation in their home countries from abroad. In the Spanish case, the French government tolerated the insurrectionary activity at first. Both countries' claims on Morocco had put a strain on diplomatic relations. But a joint military mission in 1925 to suppress native unrest brought about a rapprochement, and a mutual desire to maintain amiable relations.⁵⁰⁾ Further, the French government sought to prevent close ties between Spain and fascist Italy.⁵¹⁾ Thus, France increasingly surveilled the covert activities of the Spaniards and Catalans in exile. Time was against Macià and his compatriots.

However slim the chances of success though, the operation would establish “‘the Catalan question’ [as] front page news”, as Enric Ucelay da Cal put it, and thus turn the cause of Catalan separatism into an international affair.⁵²⁾ Even if the military action failed, they would gain valuable (international) attention for their message: the Primo de Rivera dictatorship was just another iteration of antiquated Spanish masculinity, manifest in the country’s African despotism, caused through centuries of intermixture with Muslim overlords. Meanwhile, Macià could let Catalans shine as a beacon of modern, rational masculinity, on par with European civilisations. Since according to these ideas, Catalans were more civilised than Spaniards, and thus superior to them, they deserved support for their efforts towards independence. Internally, this discourse it could also serve to consolidate Macià’s and *Estat Català*’s political hegemony in Catalan nationalism.

It must have been a large surprise for the men, when they found the French police already expecting them in Prats de Molló. As a recent study demonstrates, French officials had known of the movement’s insurrectionary plans at least since February of the same year.⁵³⁾ The majority of the insurrectionists were immediately exiled to Belgium. Only Francesc Macià himself and 15 of his closest followers were put on trial in Paris between January 20-22, 1927. During the trial, Macià took full responsibility for the proceedings and was sentenced to 6 months in prison and later exiled from France.

Estat Català would use this trial to argue the case of Catalan independence to the French and international public. Notably, in their effort to gain French support for their objectives, *Estat Català* tried to brand Catalonia in a way that made it relatable to France. After decades of crafting and consolidating a Catalan identity amongst a largely Catalan audience, it now

50) Susana Sueiro Seoane, “La política mediterránea de Primo de Rivera: El triángulo hispano-italo-francés,” *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Revista de la Facultad de Geografía e Historia. Serie 5, Historia Contemporánea* [Online], no. 1 (1988): 222.

51) Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, *Estat Català: The Strategies of Separation and Revolution of Catalan Radical Nationalism (1919-1933)* (New York, NY: Columbia University, PhD diss., 1979), 269f.

52) Ibid., 271.

53) Joan Esculies Serrat, “‘Els qui van parlar’: La delación catalana del complot de Prats de Molló,” *Rúbrica Contemporánea*[Online] 12, no. 25 (2023): 200-204.

became important to present this self-imagination in an approachable way. Macià and his comrades, as we will see, largely did so by highlighting supposed historical parallels and relations between Catalonia and France. Catalan nationalists thus far had largely drawn on Anglo-Saxon countries as a point of positive comparison, whilst France had barely received any attention in their discourses up to this point. This would mark the major difference between their internal construction of a Catalan national identity, and presenting this identity in a desirable way to outsiders.

Macià and his compatriots would not only present their arguments in court. In February, the group would publish the book *La Catalogne Rebelle*. It delivered a short history of Catalonia, its alleged democratic traditions, its suffering at the hands of Spain, and included the protocols of the trial against *Estat Català*. In that regard, it reiterated many of the points we already analysed earlier, namely, that Spain was and always had been racially tainted, brutish, and uncivilised, while Catalonia embodied the opposite and had in fact racially, culturally, and historically always belonged to Europe. Catalans were thus in various ways superior to Spaniards and thus deserved their own state, thus the propaganda went.

To win the hearts and minds of the French public, *Estat Català* first argued that Catalonia and France had deep historical and cultural ties. Through their neighbourhood in the Pyrenees, both countries shared many historical and spiritual connections. Due to Catalonia's location "in the centre of Latin Europe, the Catalan language is related to all the major Romance languages, especially French".⁵⁴⁾ Because of this, "a Catalan can speak French more easily than Spanish", as the publication claimed.⁵⁵⁾ Further, due to Catalans' contribution in the field of science, poetry, and literature they would deserve the respect and esteem of all the people with whom these connections.

Aside from a common linguistic background, history had aligned Catalonia and France. While the Islamic presence on the Iberian peninsula during the Middle Ages had had a profound influence on Spaniards, it was "almost non-existent in the Països Catalans".⁵⁶⁾ Catalans had in fact borne the brunt of the fight against the Muslims, maintaining close political, cultural, and ecclesiastical relations with the Frankish Empire, all the while forming a well-defined national identity of their own. Through centuries of Muslim presence, Spaniards lacked the abilities of other European peoples. They were neither capable of rational thought, nor of establishing stable, consent-based structures of government. Catalonia found itself detached from that history and had therefore developed like the rest of civilised Europe. These examples reiterate the same images used by Almirall, Prat de la Riba, and Puig i Cadafalch.

54) *Estat Català, La Catalogne Rebelle* (1927), Josep Carner i Ribalta, ANC1-279-T-92, Sant Cugat de Valles, Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya, 10.

55) Ibid.

56) Ibid., 14.

The major difference is that instead of claiming similarity with the Anglo-Saxons to legitimise cause, *Estat Català* highlighted Catalan ties to France, of course due to its French audience.

La Catalogne Rebelle juxtaposes the failure of Spanish imperialism during the 19th century with Catalonia's own imperial history. This history by no means included Catalonia's participation in e.g., the Cuban slave trade. Rather, the focus lay on the Crown of Aragón and its conquests all throughout the Mediterranean. While Aragón made conquests in Sicily, Greece, or North Africa, the Crown of Castile had remained on the peninsula. In turn, Catalans had continuously developed the “the Catalan soul, an accentuation of the enterprising character of this people and of its commercial knowledge”.⁵⁷⁾ Spaniards had only fought the same enemy, the Muslims, in the same environment and therefore developed “a closed mind, with an insatiable desire for domination”.⁵⁸⁾

Addressing Spanish colonialism in the Americas, *Estat Català* though turns this argument around. As Catalans had no access to the American markets and had lost their possessions in the Mediterranean, “Catalonia had to resort to its own resources: agriculture and industry, [...] accustoming the Catalans to rely on their own work for their prosperity”.⁵⁹⁾ Meanwhile, Spain failed to establish an entrepreneurial elite, as the colonial adventures had made them lazy, since they now only needed to rely on the efforts of others. As „*La Catalogne Rebelle*” further argued, Catalans had had the “most ancient Parliament of Europe”⁶⁰⁾ during the Middle Ages. This referred to the 13th century *Corts Catalanes*, an assembly of the three estates of the Crown of Aragón, which held some legislative powers.

Estat Català depicted Spain towards its international audience as a primitive, brutal, lazy people, unfit for modern industrial capitalism. As outlined by Almirall four decades prior, Macià and his comrades understood Spaniards as stuck in the outdated masculine model of Don Quijote. Catalans, meanwhile, had allegedly always possessed the superior modern European masculinity, present in their capacity for rationality, liberalism, and economic prowess. Following this line of thought, it would make no sense for France to leave Catalonia under Spanish (and thus implicitly African) rule.

Estat Català further claimed it was non-other than Maximilien de Robespierre who had promised to reinstall this institution in Catalonia. As Revolutionary France needed allies against absolutist Spain, it had looked to Catalonia for support. Promising Catalonia the establishment of the Catalan Republic, “Robespierre himself went to Perpignan in 1791, carrying in his suitcase the ancient constitutions of Catalonia, a model of democracy”.⁶¹⁾ In

57) Ibid.

58) Ibid., 15.

59) Ibid., 17.

60) Ibid., 13.

61) Ibid., 16.

1810, Napoleon would renew this promise.

Accordingly, Catalonia had historically been a democratic nation, with close ties to France and French Republicanism. France had promised independence to Catalonia on multiple occasions. The subtext of these arguments was, of course, that the French people should finally make good on their promises and support the cause of Catalan separatism, as French and Catalan civilisation shared similarly democratic histories, values, and ideals. Spain, meanwhile, was a stranger to these commonalities, and therefore undeserving of any kind of recognition and support by the European nations. While Catalans potentially sought to invoke an equation of Revolutionary France and insurrectionist Catalonia, Spain would always remain a mirror of the Ancien Régime.

Estat Català presented French citizens a Catalonia that fit well into the community of progressive and enterprising European republics, while Spain was inherently feudalistic and unable to adapt to modernity. Catalans had engaged in the good kind of imperialism, the sort that had prepared them for industrial and global capitalism. This entrepreneurial, rational, and modern personality stood in opposition to savage, despotic (even Semitic) Spanishness. While the Catalan character traits represented the correct, modern type of masculinity, Spanish traits carried the connotation of an outdated, incorrect type of masculinity, of Don Quijote and Don Juan. As in earlier iterations of this argument, *Estat Català* relied on a seemingly paradoxical utilization of history. While in the Spanish case, sticking to past patterns of behaviour was a sign of antiquated masculinity, Catalonia's modernity was already to be found in its past. Catalonia was apt to face contemporary and future challenges, because its predecessor would have already fit into the modern world.

On the following pages, the book reproduces the protocols of the court sessions and hearings. Their centrepiece is a monologue held by Francesc Macià on November 19 explaining his motivations for organising the insurrection and attempting to invade Spain with 500 men. He affirmed that Catalonia could no longer exist within Spain due to their opposing characteristics, proclaiming “the liberal spirit can never fraternise with despotism, nor the democratic spirit with inquisitorial reactionism”.⁶²⁾ This insolvable antagonism had led him and his men towards insurrection.

Choosing France, the “cradle of liberty” and Catalonia's “sister in spirit”, as their base of operation, they hoped that Catalonia would one day become a type of “Pyrenean Belgium”, which could alarm France about Spanish.⁶³⁾ To achieve this end, Macià and *Estat Català* wanted “an independent Catalan Republic in the concert of free peoples; a democratic, peaceful and republican State”.⁶⁴⁾

62) Ibid., 38.

63) Ibid.

Catalonia found itself alongside the democratic people of Europe, who had followed the course of time, and developed characteristics opposed to those of the uncivilised peoples of the world. Spain, stuck in the past due to its intermixture with Muslims, was simply different from Catalonia, which had remained pure from African influences and had always maintained a strong connection to continental Europe. Catalans therefore exhibited rationality, industriousness, and commerciality, while Spain was exuberant despotism and exploitation. Sant Jordi would prevail over Don Juan, if only France would lend its help to *Estat Català*. While Macià's vying for French public opinion would ultimately not bear fruit, he continued his efforts among the Catalan community in Cuba. In the long run, he cemented his position as key figure among Catalan nationalist and separatists, securing the presidency of the *Generalitat de Catalunya*, after the fall of the Spanish Monarchy.

Conclusion

It was October 10, 2017. After the tumultuous Catalan independence referendum a week prior, everyone anxiously expected an official declaration by the Catalan government. According to the official narrative, Catalans had nearly unanimously voted for independence from Spain, with 90 percent voting in favour. But a turnout of only 43 percent made it a dubious claim. Nevertheless, considering the efforts of the Spanish state to prevent the unconstitutional vote by having police officers exert violence against voters and raid polling stations, the number still was considerable. Thus, the initiators of the referendum believed to have full support of the Catalan people for their cause.

Following these events, Carles Puigdemont, then president of the *Generalitat de Catalunya*, would step in front of the Catalan parliament and proudly celebrate the democratic character of the referendum, whilst lambasting Spain's disproportionate response. "It is the first time in the history of the European democracies, that an election day takes place under violent police attacks against voters",⁶⁴ he declared. While Catalans allegedly had ever peacefully advocated and worked for their autonomy since the end of the Franco dictatorship, Spain, especially in the past seven years, had responded with an increasing effort in centralising the state, culminating in the violent suppression of the referendum. All of this, even though had not only been the economic motor of Spain, but also a "factor of modernisation and stability" whilst also having been played a central role in "returning the Spanish state to the European and international institutions after 40 years of isolation and autarchy".

64) Ibid., 39.

65) Carles Puigdemont, "El discurs de Carles Puigdemont sobre la declaració d'independència de Catalunya," *VilaWeb*, 2017 Available at: <https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/el-discurs-de-carles-puigdemont-sobre-la-declaracio-dindependencia-de-catalunya/> (Accessed: 05 March 2024).

From the Catalan perspective, the case was clear-cut. Spain had violated their democratic right to self-determination. Catalonia had always been the modern, democratic force introducing Spain into the European community, whereas Spain resisted these processes kicking and screaming. Now that Catalonia wanted to take its rightful place among the civilised nations of Europe, leaving behind the baggage of Spain, the latter relied on violence to maintain its authority. Evidence for this were mainly recent events or trends going back not further than the end of the Franco dictatorship.

As historians though, we know that negative images are barely as young as only one generation. Thus, the idea of a democratic European Catalonia facing a despotic non-European Spain was older than the Franco or even Primo de Rivera dictatorship. Conceiving Catalonia as civilised, modern, and even liberal had been at the core of Catalan nationalism since its very inception, alongside the notion of Catalan masculinity.

I have outlined that gender and nationalism share an intimate connection. Further, understanding gender as a relation category, makes it possible for us to use it in historical analysis, outside of simply writing the history of men, women, and anyone outside of heteronormativity. In that regard, gender denotes notions of superiority and inferiority, where a hegemonic masculinity dominates anyone and anything deemed as feminine or deviantly masculine. In the case of Spain and Catalonia, Europeans and Catalans deemed Spain as inferior.

At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Catalan nationalists established, that Catalonia was unaffected by the crisis of masculinity the former Spanish empire had experienced. They argued that Catalans exhibited masculine qualities such as rationality, inclinations towards liberalism and democracy, as well as economic finesse, which found their equal among the European great powers, such as Great Britain. Hell-bent on proving that they did not share the degenerate qualities of Spanish masculinity, they sought to align themselves with what they considered the civilised nations of Europe. Therein, they found the justification for demanding autonomy or even leadership within Spain. This period very well represents the establishment of a strong Catalan national identity internally, which could serve as a reservoir to promote the nation to the outside world.

First attempts at external branding started out in the 1920s, publicly most impactful event being Macià's trial in Paris. In contrast to internal efforts to stabilise and establish a Catalan identity, these external efforts tried to create a strong relation between Catalonia and its international audience, in this case France, Catalonia's "sister in spirit". As outlined, Macià and *Estat Català* presented the French public with all the charges against Spain that Catalans had exchanged amongst each other during decades prior: Spaniards were inherently despotic, lazy, aggressive, incapable of rational thought and modern industrial capitalism, and were

rather African than European. While Macià did not make any outright references to gender and masculinity, the attributes and characteristics he ascribes to Spaniards and Catalans implicitly carry the notion of inferior and superior masculinity, as they were the same qualities described by Catalan nationalists in the years before. Similarly, Macià's supporter Antoni Virigili i Rovira would note in *Revista de Catalunya*, “the liberal man is an advanced man”.⁶⁶ Thus, to be liberal was to be civilised, modern, and masculine. Macià therefore branded the Catalan nation as on par with civilised European masculinity, and thus worthy of support in its desires for independence.

Using traits of an undesirable, outdated masculinity, such as laziness, lack of emotional control, and brutality to depict Spain as an uncivilised, degenerate, “African” country, Catalans aimed to endear France to their cause. Catalans, exhibiting modern masculine traits such as industriousness, rationality, and a desire for liberal democracy, were just as civilised as the rest of Western Europe. Branding Catalonia in such a fashion was supposed to mobilise any support possible from the French public to free the nation from the Spanish yoke.

Contemporary Catalan separatism conceives itself as a liberal, democratic, feminist, European movement, suppressed by Spanish despotism. This self-conception feeds on the violent reaction of the Spanish state to the referendum in 2017, as well as the suppression of Catalan culture during Francoism. Both serve to justify Catalonia's claim and to win over international sympathy for Catalonia's struggle. While it is true that Spain sought to stifle the expression of Catalan identity in these and other situations, it obfuscates the origin of the duality liberal Catalonia vs. savage and authoritarian Spain. At the heart of this brand lies the notion that Catalonia simply is and was the more advanced, more masculine nation.

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⁶⁶) *Revista de Catalunya*, Defensa del Liberalisme, 01. June 1928, p. 574.

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■ Tobias J. Klee

Tobias J. Klee holds an MA degree in Global History from the Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg and an MA degree in Citizenship and Human Rights: Ethics and Politics from the Universitat de Barcelona. In his dissertation project he analyses the historical emergence of Catalan nationalism between 1898 and 1936 through the analytical category of gender. Currently, he works as a social worker in Berlin for the EU funded EDIS project, offering counselling and support for newly immigrated EU citizens, especially from the south of the European Union.